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Cantor: Antitrust Law

ANTITRUST LAW
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES THE NOERRPENNINGTON DOCTRINE

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc./ the Ninth Circuit limited the extent to which efforts
to influence the findings of administrative agencies are immune
from the antitrust laws under the Noerr-Pennington 2 doctrine
and its concomitant sham exception. 3
The plaintiff was a freight forwarder,· subject to regulation
under the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) and regulated by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The defendants were
trucking companies regulated by the ICC and the Rocky Mountain Motor Tari~ Bureau (RMMTB), a rate bureau formed
under the ICA.II
ICC rate regulations8 provide that a freight forwarder seeking a rate change publish the amended schedule. In the absence
of protest, the rate will automatically take effect. Plaintiff, seeking a lower rate, published the desired rate change. 7 RMMTB
1. 674 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were
Wallace, J. and von der Heydt, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, _ U.S. _,
103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
2. The term Noerr-Pennington comes from two Supreme Court cases. See United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), Eastern RR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
3. See generally, Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government
Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80
(1977).
4. A freight forwarder assembles and consolidates small shipments into single lots
for carrier companies to then ship. 674 F.2d at 1257.
5. A rate bureau is an organization formed by carriers to set rates and fares for
members within an ICC-approved agreement. RMMTS's membership services 80 percent of the transcontinental surface transportation market. Id.
6. ICC rate regulation of freight forwarders such as Clipper is provided· in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1005 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10725, 10762 (1976».
7. In 1970, plaintiff published a lowered rate of $1056, but hoped eventually to lower
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protested the lower rate to the ICC. 8 Thereafter, plaintiff filed
several amendments to the new rate, progressively lowering it.s
RMMTB protested each amendment. During this administrative
process,10 the ICC consistently ruled for the plaintiff, and the
defendants exhausted all ICC procedures to prevent implementation of the lower rate. 11
In 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint in district court against
RMMTB and various trucking companies,12 alleging antitrust violations. 13 Plaintiff contended (1) defendants' protests of the
rate were sham protests filed for the purpose of directly interfering with competitive activity; (2) in protesting to the ICC, defendants furnished false information.14
The district court, in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment/II held that defendants' protests were immune as
a matter of law under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that (1) factual issues existed
concerning whether defendants' activities came within the sham
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine;16 (2) a single suit
or protest is sufficient to invoke the sham exception;17 (3) in order to invoke the sham exception, plaintiff is not required to
prove that access to a governmental body is foreclosed;18 (4) furnishing false information to an administrative agency in connecits rate to $842. Plaintiff expected defendants to protest to the ICC any lowered rate it
published. Plaintiff felt RMMTB had always tried to maintain the rates of freight forwarders and carriers to an equal level and would take action to maintain that parity. 674
F.2d at 1257.
8. [d.
9. [d.
10. If there is a protest, the ICC can suspend effectiveness of the rate while it investigates the protest. The ICC did not suspend the $1,056 rate, but did investigate the rate
over the next two years. [d.
11. [d.
12. [d. at 1257-58.
13. Plaintiff claimed damages for: (1) the loss incurred in delaying institution of its
final rate; (2) the costs of responding to the protests; and (3) business loss because of the

uncertainty surrounding plaintiff's rates. Plaintiff claimed that shippers will not use a
rate if it is under ICC investigation. [d. at 1258.
14. [d. at 1257-58. Clipper also contended that the protests were part of a larger
antitrust violation. [d.
15. The district court denied the defendants' two previous motions for summary
judgment. [d.
16. [d. at 1264.
17. [d. at 1267.
18. [d. at 1269.
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tion with an adjudicatory proceeding can be the basis for antitrust liability if accompanied by predatory intent and other
elements of an antitrust claim. Ie This note will explore the basis
for the coures decision and discuss its significance in terms of
clarifying an important area of antitrust law.

B.

BACKGROUND

The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The proliferation of government regulation in industry and
business has forced the courts to consider whether attempts to
gain competitive advantages through the exercise of the right to
petition are in some cases a misuse of government processes in
violation of the Sherman Act. 20
Under the judicially created Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
bona fide efforts to obtain or influence legislative, executive, judicial or administrative actions are immune from antitrust liability.21 However, if the purported effort to influence or obtain government action is in reality merely an attempt to interfere with
the business relationships of a competitor, the activity may not
enjoy antitrust immunity.22
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception
were first enunciated in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference u. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 2s In Noerr, the Supreme
19. Id. at 1271.
20. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ...... 15 U.S.C. §
1 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes all attempts and conspiracies to monopolize. "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . ahall be deemed guilty
...... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See infra notes 24-55 & accompanying text.
21. See generally 7 von Kalinowski, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 46.04 (1980).
22. 365 U.S. at 144.
23. Id. Noerr involved a battle between the railroad industry and the trucking industry over long-haul freight business. A group of truck operations sued twenty-four railroads and a public relations firm, claiming the defendants conspired to restrain trade in
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by concertedly engaging in a massive
publicity canIpaign designed to promote laws and law enforcement practices destructive
to the trucking industry. Plaintiff alleged that the sole purpose of the canIpaign was to
undermine its competitiveness with respect to the railroad. Id. at 129-130. For a detailed
analysis of the facts in Noerr, see Waldon, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and
the Right to Petition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1211, 1214-20 (1967).
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Court held that no violation of the Sherman Act can be predicated on mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement
of laws, even if the conduct is for an anticompetitive purpose
and is accomplished by deliberate deception of public officials. 2•
The Court advanced four arguments in support of their rul211
ing. First, the Court stated that there was an "essential dissimilarity" between agreements to seek government actions and
agreements traditionally constituting violations of the antitrust
laws, such as price-fixing agreements and boycotts. 26 Second, to
subject attempts to influence the passage of legislation to antitrust sanctions impaired the functioning of a representative government by reducing the flow of information on which government agencies are dependent.27 Third, the court recognized the
differences between conduct which is political activity, not regulated by the Sherman Act, and business activity, which is the
focus of the Act. 28 Fourth, construing the Sherman Act to include attempts to influence government would raise constitutional questions, since the right to petition the government IS
protected by the first amendment. 29
The Court in Noerr also announced a "sham" exception to
its newly created antitrust immunity. The Court stated that antitrust immunity may not extend to activities ostensibly directed
toward influencing government action, but which were in reality
a mere sham to disguise an attempt to interfere with a competitor's business relationships. so
24. 365 U.S. at 135-36.
25. See Fishel, supra note 3 at 82-83.
26. 365 U.S. at 136.
27. Id. at 137. See Note, Antitrust-Supreme Court Extends Noerr Immunity From
Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Adjudication, 76 DICK L. REV. 593, 594-95
(1972), for a more complete discussion of this point.
28. 365 U.S. at 137.
29. Id. at 138; the plaintiff in Noerr contended that even if attempts to influence
government were exempt from antitrust liability, the defendants had forfeited that exemption because, one, their sole purpose was to destroy competition; and two, the publicity campaign involved deliberate deception of the public and public officials. The
Court held, however, that the right of people to inform their government representatives
and the legality of conduct directed toward obtaining government action cannot be made
to depend on an anti-competitive intent or purpose that may advantage one group and
disadvantage another. The Court further reasoned that even though the publicity campaign was not ethical, it fell within the range of political activity and therefore was not
subject to regulation by the Sherman Act. Id. at 138-41.
30. Id. at 144.
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The antitrust immunity for attempts to influence legislative·
decisions established in Noerr was reaffirmed and extended to
include attempts to influence executive action in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington. 11 The Court in Pennington
held that joint efforts to influence public officials, even if intended to eliminate competition, did not violate the antitrust
laws. III

Expansion of the Sham Exception
In California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited," the
Supreme Court extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to attempts to influence administrative and judicial (adjudicatory)
bodies. 84 The Court held, however, that if the petitioning of activities deprived a rival of access to the administrative and judicial process, or if a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims was involved the, sham exception enunciated in Noerr would apply."
Two recent cases have further expanded the sham exception. ls In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,8' the Supreme
Court held that litigation intended to delay and prevent the establishment of rival competition constituted a sham." In deter-

-

31. 381 U.S. 657. In Pennington, a BJDall mine company brought an action under II
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against the United Mine Workers and certain Iarp c:oal
companies. Plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in anticompetitive efforts to influence the Secretary of Labor to obtain a minimum wage requirement for employees of
contractors selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority, making it difficult for small
companies to compete in TVA contracts. Id. at 659-60.
32. Id. at 670.
33. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
34. In Trucking, the Supreme Court held that a complaint should not be dismissed
which alleged that defendants, nineteen large California trucking firms, instituted
groundless proceedings before state agencies and courts to prevent plaintiffs, a group of
interstate trucking firms, from obtaining necessary administrative approvals. Id. at 509.
For a more detailed analysis of the facts in Trucking, see, Note, Antitrust: The Braku
"Fail on the Noerr-Doctrine, 57 CALII'. L. REv. 518, 520-24 (1969).
35. 404 U.S. at 512; the Court stated that the very fact such suits were baseless
would be evidence that they were instituted primarily in order to drive a competitor out
of business rather than to assert a legitimate legal right. Id. The Trucking Court based
its decision on the first amendment rights to petition. Id. at 512.
36. See generally, Crawford & Tschoepe, The Erosion 0/ the Noerr Pennington Immunity, 13 ST. MARy's L.J. 291, 302-04 (1981).
37. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
38. Otter Tall, an electric power company serving three states, had franchisee in
several towns. The towns decided to establish municipal electricity distribution lystelDS
when Otter Tail's franchiEes expired. One condition of sale for bonds to finance these
systems was that there be" no pending litigation which might affect the bonds. By insti-
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mining the existence of a sham, the Court considered the multiplicity of lawsuits and whether such suits carried the "hallmark
of insubstantial claims."3s

Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.,40 dealt with the single
sham suit issue, but not within the Noerr-Pennington context. 41
During an analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act,42 the court made
reference to the Trucking language of "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims. "43 This discussion of repetitive suits dealt only
with whether litigation can be enjoined and not with the requirements for an antitrust violation. However, lower courts"
have relied on Lektro- Vend as authority for the proposition that
a single baseless suit can be the basis for an antitrust claim. 41i
Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit considered the sham exception in
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers. 48 In Franchise Realty, the
tuting suits challenging the bonds, Otter Tail prevented the towns from establishing
their own systems. ld. at 369-72.
39. ld. at 380.
40. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
41. In Lektro- Vend, the plaintiffs, in response to a state court suit against them for
breach of non-competition agreements, brought suit in federal court claiming that the
agreements violated antitrust laws under 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982), and that the purpose of
the defendant's state-court lawsuit was to harass and eliminate competition. Mter judgment was entered in the state proceeding, the plaintiffs were granted a federal injunction
against collection. 433 U.S. at 623. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the federal
district court should not have intervened in the state court proceedings by enjoining
enforcement of the judgment. The result in Lektro- Vend is the narrow holding that a
federal judge can enjoin the commencement of additional state court suits, not because
several suits constitute an antitrust violation while one does not, but rather because the
anti-injunction statute only prohibits the enjoining of existing state suits. ld. at 636; see
id. at 637 n.8.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
43. 433 U.S. at 635 n.6, 636, 639 n.9.
44. See, e.g., 674 F.2d at 1266 n.24; Colorado Petroleum Marketers Assn. v. Southland Corp. 467 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979), Cyborg Systems Inc. v. Management Science Am., Inc., 78-1 Trade Cas. 11 61,927 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
45. Justice Stevens, writing for four dissenters, concluded that under the anti-injunction statute federal courts can enjoin a state court proceeding which is itself an antitrust violation. Further, a single abuse of the adjudicatory process could constitute an
antitrust violation. 433 U.S. at 654-61.
46. 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977). In Franchise,
the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that two associations of
restaurant and hotel employers and a labor union had combined and conspired to repeatedly, baselessly, and in bad faith, oppose the granti.ng of building permits by the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss1/5

6

1984]

Cantor: Antitrust Law

ANTITRUST LAW

35

defendants opposed applications for building permits. The administrative agency which acted on permits was found by the
court to be "as much a political as an adjudicatory body.""? The
court stated that the sham exception does not apply to direct
lobbying efforts, but only to situations where defendants are not
seeking official action by a governmental body."a Furthermore, a
complaint must include allegations of specific activities which
barred access to a governmental body."9 Re<:ently, in Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc. v. Codding,r.o involving threats of multiple lawsuits,
the Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts at issue from those in
Franchise Realty.r.1 The court held that a claim for relief is possible under the sham exception when the threat of litigation is
used to retain a monopoly and thereby bar a competitor from
the market.r.2
Other Circuits

The other circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether a
single sham suit can constitute an antitrust violation. Some
courts maintain that repetitive, baseless suits must be shown to
establish a violation. r.a Another line of precedent concludes that
a single sham suit is sufficient.U
local Board of Permit Appeals to a competitor. [d. at 1078.
47. [d. at 1079.
48. [d. at 1080-81.
49. [d. at 1082.
SO. 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980). In Codding, a real estate developer alleged that a
rival developer filed or underwrote thirteen overlapping, repetitive and baseless lawsuits
for purposes of maintaining a monopoly and elinlinating the plaintiff as a competitor. [d.
at 833-34.
51. See supra notes 46-49 & accompanying text.
52. 615 F.2d at 840-42.
53. See, e.g., Taylor Drug Stores, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 560 F.2d 211,
213 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (a single successful lawsuit is not a sham); First Nat'l
Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp. 514,'520-21 (D. Minn. 1979)
(single lawsuit with no unethical conduct accompanying its institution, insufficient to fall
within mere sham exception) aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 4SO U.S.
1042 (1981); Mountain Grove Cemetery Assn. v. Norwalk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951,
955-56 (D. Conn. 1977) (to permit institution of sham clainls on the basis of one suit
would be an undue deterrent to legitimate petition of courts); Central Bank of Clayton v.
Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (single intervention in administrative and judicial proceedings not a sham) aff'd. 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 910 (1977).
54. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543
(5th Cir. 1978) (a showing of a pattern of repetitive, baseless, claims is strong evidence of
a sham petitioning, but s'lch evidence is not essential to proof of sham) cert. denied,
Palmer v. Feminist Women's Health Center, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cad-
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A second area of disagreement among the circuits is whether
. access to the agencies and courts must be foreclosed in order to
state a valid antitrust claim under the sham exception. A majority of the circuits hold that the essential element of a valid sham
exception claim is the allegation of an absence of a genuine effort to influence government with the intent to injure a competitor directly, rather than an allegation that access was barred.1iIi
A minority of circuits focus on whether plaintiffs were denied free and unlimited access to the tribunals. 68 These courts
have held that in order to constitute violation, sham litigation
involving an administrative agency must bar potential competitors from access to the decision making process. 67
C.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

In remanding to the district court, the Ninth Circuit found
as a factual question the issue of whether conduct was a genuine
effort to influence government action, thereby entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, or a mere sh~m.68
Since the defendants admitted arguendo that their protests were filed automatically and without regard to their merit, the protests were baseless for purposes of a summary judgment motion.
The fact that defendants lost all protests further underscored
that the protests were baseless, thereby establishing a sufficient
showing to present a triable issue of fact. 59 Thus, for purposes of
illac Gage Co., 507 F. Supp. 939, 946 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (no per se requirement that more
than one claim underlie cause of action based upon "sham" litigation, nor must plaintiff
allege denial of access); Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging Inc., 480 F. Supp. 124, 127-28 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (one lawsuit brought to prevent alleged trade secrets violations can constitute antitrust violation when brought in bad faith
or without probable cause); Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476
F. Supp. 373, 378 (D. Colo. 1979) (Supreme Court did not intend to give "every dog one
free bite, thus making it an irrebuttable presumption that the first law suit was not a
sham regardless of overwhelming evidence indicating otherwise.").
55. E.g., Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288, 295 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
56. E.g., Mountain Grove Cemetery Ass'n v. Norfolk Vault Co., 428 F. Supp. 951 (D.
Conn. 1977); Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Mi.,
1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Bethlehem
Plaza v. Campbell, 493 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
57. As one court has stated, "(a]ccess-barring is the cornerstone of the sham exception." Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1134-35 (N.D. N.Y.
1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
58. 674 F.2d at 1264.
59. Id. at 1267.
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summary judgment, plaintiffs showed sufficiently that the defendants' protests were baseless and prosecuted without regard to
their merit, intended rather to delay competitive conduct and
not to influence governmental action. 80
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a single suit or single protest was sufficient to invoke the sham exception.81 The court
based its conclusion on the first amendment theory governing
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Not all activity that appears as
an effort to influence the government is actually an exercise of
the first amendment right to petition. It simply may be an effort
to interfere directly with a competitor. In that case, the "sham"
petitioning is not entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, regardless of whether it is a single suit or multiple suits. 82
The court next stated that, despite the holdings of Otter
88
Tail and Trucking," harassment of a rival through an administrative proceeding may have the same effect as harassment
through the judicial system. 8S The court saw no reason to distinguish cases on the basis of the specific petitioning activity
involved. 88
The court further found that its decision was not inconsistent with Franchise Realty, where the Ninth Circuit held that
access barring was a necessary element of a sham claim. 87 The
court noted that the recent Ninth Circuit decision· of Codding
found a cause of action under the sham exception despite the
absence of access barring and the decision in Franchise Realty.88
The defendants contended that if proof of access barring
60. Id. at 1264. On remand plaintiffs will need to establish facts to invoke the sham
exception. Id. Defendants' contended that to fall within the sham exception, Trucking
required that the alleged misconduct (1) consist of a pattern of repetitive claims; (2) be
baseless; and (3) bar access to the governmental body. Id. at 1265.
61. Id. at 1267.
62. Id. at 1266.
63. In Otter Tail, the litigation used to suppress competition actually gave the
plaintiffs greater access to the courts. Id.
64. Id. at 1268.
65.Id.
66.Id.
67. 674 F.2d at 1268.
68. 615 F.2d at 841 n.4.
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was not required, every competitor who was adversely effected
by the filing of a protest would bring an antitrust action against
the protesting party. Such increased litigation would deter the
exercise of first amendment rights. 8s In response to this contention, the court stated that a plaintiff must prove the usual elements of an antitrust violation in addition to showing that a defendant's petitioning activity was an attempt to interfere with
the business relationships of a competitor. 70 The court found
this burden of proof sufficient to protect the exercise of first
amendment rights. Accordingly, invoking the sham exception requires an allegation of some abuse of process, but not necessarily
access barring. 71
In adopting a new rule for the Ninth Circuit, the court
stated that if the requisite predatory intent is present and the
other elements of an antitrust claim are proven, fraudulently
furnishing false information to an agency conducting an adjudicatory proceeding can be the basis for antitrust liability.72
The court pointed out that the adjudicatory sphere in Clipper was different from the political sphere involved in Noerr and
Pennington. In the political sphere the falsity of statements can
be detected more readily, whereas in the adjudicatory sphere information supplied by the parties is necessarily relied upon for
decision making. If the information furnished is fraudulent, the
functioning of these agencies is thwarted. Therefore, immunity
from either antitrust laws or first amendment protection can
never be granted to a party who with predatory intent furnishes
69. 674 F.2d at 1269.
70. Id. This necessarily includes showing there was also not a genuine effort to influence government action.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1271. This holding extends the Walker Process doctrine to cases not arising in the patent context. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172 (1965), posed the question of whether maintenance and enforcement of a
patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may be the basis of an action under § 2 of
the Sherman Act, and therefore subject to a treble damage claim by an injured party
under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court held that "the enforcement of a patent
procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 . . . provided the other
elements necessary to a § 2 case are present." Id. at 174. The fact that Walker Process
provides a rule of general applicability was intimated by the statement in Trucking concerning misrepresentations which are condoned in the political arena, but which are not
condoned when used in the judicial process. 404 U.S. at 513.
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false information to an adjudicatory body.73
D.

ANALYSIS

The central problem surrounding claims based on the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its sham exception rule has
been the definition of evidentiary requirements necessary to
state a cause of action. In Clipper, the Ninth Circuit finally provides clear guidelines for interpreting the doctrine and clarifies
the basis for and limitations of three key criteria in stating a
cause of action. 7•

Pattern of Repetitive Claims
Under Clipper, the first amendment is deemed the basis for
immunity from antitrust laws,n that is, the conduct being scrutinized must be evaluated by applying first amendment criteria.
The first amendment does not protect intentional falsehoods. 7•
By analogy, litigation or protests that a competitor knows to be
without legitimate foundation are unprotected. 77 Therefore, regardless of whether a single claim or a pattern of claims is involved, fraudulent activity should not be protected. As the court
in Clipper correctly reasons, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a single claim can invoke the sham exception. 78
The "pattern of baseless repetitive claims"79 language of
Trucking is treated by some circuits as requiring that there be a
73. 674 F.2d at 1271. The court applies the statement of the Supreme Court, "there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
74. As two commentators state, "IDJuring the twenty years since Noerr was decided,
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have struggled to ... establish the true
scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine." Crawford & Tschoepe, supra note 36, at 292.
75. 674 F.2d at 1265.
76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
77. See Balmer, Sham Litigation And The Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 39,
61 (1980).
78. [d. at 71 n.7. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 203b (1978):
It is true, of course, that a repetitious pattern of clearly
unmeritorious litigation makes proof of bad faith and abuse of
the judicial processes much easier. There is however, nothing
inherently illogical in the possibility that a single lawsuit may
be filed with the purpose of directly interfering with another's
business so that the antitrust laws would be violated as a
result.
[d. at 71 n.7.
79. 404 U.S. at 513.
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cause of action for antitrust liability.80 This reflects a narrow interpretation of Trucking. A better analysis would be to view the
"pattern" requirement as an illustration of an antitrust violation
and not as a minimum standard. 81 Although repetitious lawsuits
are an indication that activity is a sham, they are not a prerequisite for the imposition of liability. The prosecution of a single
sham suit can be a significant restraint of trade in furtherance of
monopolization, and therefore should be punished under the
Sherman Act.

Access Denial
It remains unclear whether the harm caused by baseless litigation can constitute an antitrust violation even though access
to the agencies and the courts is not actually restricted.82 The
confusion stems from the language of Trucking, where the Court
not only spoke of "a purpose to deprive competitors of meaningful access to the agencies and the courts," but also noted that
the judicial process had been abused. 83 Although a minority of
circuit courts have drawn the implication that any abuse of judicial. process is tantamount to barring effective access to the
courts,84 such a broad reading is unwarranted.

In Trucking, the concepts of access barring and abuse of the
judicial process were treated as synonymous. There, the defendants intervened in every proceeding, and as a result both
abused the agency processes and effectively foreclosed plaintiffs
from access to the agency.8t1 In Otter Tail, however, the abuse of
process was a result of the maintenance of prolonged litigation."
The defendant's primary goal was to delay or halt competition
rather than to discourage the use of the judicial process. 87 By
focusing on the repetitive and insubstantial nature of the claims,
Otter Tail indicates that access barring refers only to one type
of abuse which may constitute an antitrust violation. Therefore,
SO. See supra note 54 for cases where a pattern of baseless claims was held to be a
prerequisite for antitrust liability.
81. See Lektro- Vend, 433 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. See Balmer, supra note 77, at 42.
83. 404 U.S. at 512.
84. See supra note 56 for cases which find access barring conduct by the defendants.
85. 404 U.S. at 511.
86. 410 U.S. at 380.
87. See, R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX at 355 (1978).
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the interpretation of Trucking by some courts that it requires
access barring is too narrow. A better interpretation of Otter
Tail and Trucking is that in Trucking, the defendant's conduct
constituted a sham primarily because there was no genuine ef. fort to influence governmental action and also because access to
governmental action was denied. 88
The Ninth Circuit in Clipper properly applies first amendment principles as a basis for analyzing access denial in the context of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Baseless litigation
through abuse of process can force a competitor out of business
or prevent expansion even though the litigation does not literally
bar the competitor from access to the courts. Such action constitutes an antitrust violation despite the fact that the competitor's
redress to violation of its first amendment rights was not foreclosed. 89 Hence, the court correctly views baseless litigation in
the administrative agency context as an abuse which is not required to rise to the level of access barring to constitute an antitrust violation. Filing a suit without merit which intentionally
harms a competitor is in itself a violation that is undeserving of
protection.

Fraud
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the rights of the
business community to employ governmental processes for the
resolution of legal, economic and social problems. If, however, in
asserting these rights for private gain' the governmental
processes are abused, the issue arises as to whether the conduct
involved is immune. 9o

Trucking suggests that when considering misrepresentations
made to governmental bodies, a distinction should be drawn between those bodies whose functions are essentially legislative or
political, and those whose functions are essentially adjudicative. 91 In Noerr, the court stressed that deceptive statements
made to legislators in an attempt to influence legislation are po88. See generally, Fischel, supra note 3, at 105-10, for a general discussion of the
sham exception.
89. See BORK, supra note 87, at 347-49.
90. See id. at 355-56.
91. "Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when
used in the adjudicatory process." 404 U.S. at 513.
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litical activity traditionally accorded wide latitude by the
courts. 92 Therefore, absent proof that the defendants lacked the
intention to influence governmental action, attempts to influence the legislative or executive branches in connection with the
formation of governmental policy are not condemned as a sham.
In contrast, furnishing fraudulent information in the adjudicative setting is not protected under the guise of political expression. Such activity, seen both as evidence of bad faith and as an
attempt to impede governmental operations, subjects the initiating party to antitrust attack.
. ·Regulatory agencies, such as the ICC, conduct quasi-judicial
administrative proceedings. The same degree of protection afforded judicial proceedings should be extended to regulatory
agencies, as both often depend on highly technical factual data
supplied by the regulated industry. Regulatory agencies necessarily rely on the honesty of the parties before them as they lack
the time and resources to conduct investigations and scrutinize
information provided to them. 93 Accordingly, even though the
tactics used to influence the legislative or executive branches do
not affect antitrust immunity, the penalty for knowingly providing false information to a court or to an adjudicating regulatory
agency is loss of the Noerr-Pennington exemption.
Yet, it is necessary to protect some false statements and
baseless claims in order to avoid a "chilling effect" on the right
to petition. 9 • Statements made which invoke the sham exception
are analogous to speech that is unprotected by the first amendment. This constitutional analysis, properly adopted by Clipper,
signifies that the first amendment protects litigation from antitrust liability to the same extent that it protects speech from
government restriction. Litigation that a plaintiff knows to be
based on fraudulent information, like known falsehoods in the
free speech area, is unprotected.
Building on the analogy to the first amendment cases, deci92. 365 U.S. at 140-4l.
93. In an amicus brief submitted in Clipper, the ICC urged the court to find that
deliberate misrepresentations of material facts to the ICC will make out an antitrust
claim. Amicus Curiae Brief at p.ll. Clipper.
94. See Hibner, Litigation As An Overt Act - Development And Prognosis. 46
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. J. 718. 720 (1978).
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sions dealing with free speech require a showing that the
speaker knowingly lied or recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of his statement. 911 This is a high standard. Therefore, to
protect first amendment values, the standard for challenging
sham suits as antitrust violations should be comparable to the
standards applied in first amendment decisions. The party
claiming that Noerr-Pennington immunity is not applicable
must prove that defendants knew the falsity of their statements
and made those statements deliberately to mislead a regulatory
body.98

E.

CONCLUSION

Previously, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been applied
inconsistently by the courts. The Ninth Circuit in Clipper was
presented with an opportunity to articulate the principles governing the scope of antitrust immunity granted to those who attempted to influence administrative agencies. From the court's
analysis it is clear that the central inquiry regarding the conduct
of defendants asserting the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
whether their actions merit first amendment protection. 97 It follows that the sham exception should encompass only activity
without constitutional protection.
Our highly technological society has made government more
dependent upon private industry for information. With this dependency comes a greater duty for industry to be fair and open
in dealings with government. The antitrust laws can serve an essential role in insuring the integrity of this relationship 98 by providing clear guidance for permissible competitive behavior in
business-governmental interaction. The Ninth Circuit has taken
a significant step toward this goal by clarifying an important
area of antitrust law.

Phyllis Mariam Cantor*

95. 376 u.S. 254; 41S U.S. at 347-50.
96. See Balmer, supra note 77, at 56-61. See generally, J.G. VAN CISE & W.T. LIP-'
LAND, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1980).
97. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 122.
9S. See Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66
MICH. L. REV., 333, 356 (1967).
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